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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the increasing role and growing dependence on private military 
companies (PMCs) by the U.S. government, in particular, the U.S. Air Force (USAF).  It 
highlights potential areas of concern when using PMCs to provide combat capabilities, 
and offers possible solutions for solving or mitigating these problems in future conflicts.  
The main argument of this thesis is that the role of PMCs has become blurred with 
traditional governmental functions, and that their use in future conflicts should be 
evaluated based on monetary, personnel, and material savings for the USAF and its 
abilities to balance international and domestic political needs and objectives, while 
accomplishing its national security mission. 
This thesis will answer the following questions: How does the USAF use PMCs 
in aspects of control, oversight, and accountability during conflicts, and what are the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
While it is clear that the United States has the most sophisticated and 
technologically advanced military in the world, it is also clear that it is dependent on 
Private Military Companies (PMCs) to cover many insufficiencies in its abilities to wage 
war.  The role of the use of PMCs by the USAF is still in the initial trial phases and they 
have yet to be accepted as players in air operations and combat capability.  Today PMCs 
are used in operations at home and abroad to augment power for Homeland Defense and 
support Homeland Security missions to achieve policy goals.  But, what is the future role 
of PMCs with regard to providing combat capability to the United States Air Force 
(USAF), and to what extent could PMCs provide combat support to augment the required 
capability necessary for the USAF to carry out its mission?  
B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
At a time when the USAF is the smallest it has been in terms of personnel in 50 
years, facing ever-growing budget shortfalls and project cost overruns, it will continue to 
look for ways of saving money.  Since the Persian Gulf War, when the vast majority of 
all combat capability was military, every operation has increased the use of PMCs to 
accomplish its mission, and it is clear that this trend will continue as long as the USAF 
continues to downsize and operations become more costly.1 
A pressing issue is trying to persuade a military community that has historically 
been the sole combat provider of the U.S. government to accept an outside company 
stepping in to provide a capability.  The USAF has resisted allowing anyone other than 
commissioned officers to fly Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), while sister services allow  
 
 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” August 2008. Table 
2, 13. 
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enlisted personnel to operate their RPA.  What is the likelihood that the USAF will allow 
the last few remaining piloted missions to be handed over to a PMC?   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The concept of using PMCs to conduct combat missions while under contract of 
the USAF raises far-reaching questions of what is considered actual combat operations by 
the USAF, who has the right to conduct those operations, as well as legal and political 
concerns.  These stem from the viewpoints of military and governmental leaders that the 
U.S. military is stretched too thin in current combat operations and must be augmented by 
contractors to provide the services necessary to sustain these operations due to either a 
lack in training of military personnel or its inability to provide enough manpower to 
accomplish or support an operation.  My views are that the use of PMCs could lead to 
interfering with a state’s sovereign right to use force and agreements governing the uses 
and treatment of military personnel during armed engagements. 
A secondary issue involves the use of PMCs in providing “inherent government 
functions” related to military actions and operations in support of U.S. policy and interest 
abroad.  This is not to say that PMCs have not firmly established their place in logistical 
support and engineering roles during military operations, but will there be an opportunity 
for them to provide combat capabilities in future conflicts?  I anticipate that this will, in 
fact, be the case in future low-intensity conflicts due to continued manpower, 
procurement, and budgetary cutbacks facing the U.S. military.  This combat capability 
would provide a much-needed low cost force multiplier in accomplishing U.S. objectives.  
These cost restraints are due to the initial and recurring expense of training pilots and 
ensuring their proficiency, the development cost of new advanced fighters and bombers 
that are designed for a peer adversary and are not useful or cost-effective against trans-
national terrorist organizations or non-state actors, and because there could be political 
ramifications that limit the use of next-generation aircraft in low intensity/regional 
conflicts.  It is in using PMCs to conduct combat operations that the U.S. government 
must make the case that it is both moral and legal to contract out a combat capability as  
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long as it is completely supported and controlled by the sourcing government and any 
issues or consequences that might arise are fully accepted by the contracting agency or 
firm.   
The policies and opinions of leaders must be reflected in the laws passed by our 
government to allow for this type of action to commence in a combat area lest we be seen 
by the rest of the world as a callous nation who uses mercenaries to accomplish our goals. 
My hypothesis is that the USAF will evolve to allow the usage of PMCs to 
provide capabilities that it is unable or unwilling to support.  The inability to provide 
support could be due to a number of reasons from a deficiency of airframe capability to 
provide a mission set to the cost associated with providing an organic asset to meet 
mission requirements.  This may include, but not be limited to, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance gathering, close air support of ground forces, and actual engagement 
of hostile forces.  The USAF is already examining the feasibility and cost estimates of 
contracting out a portion of its aerial re-fueling capability to private companies. 
I anticipate that the USAF will continue to focus on a state-sponsored threat from 
a near or peer competitor that will shape its acquisitions into next-generation fighters and 
bombers.  The necessity to maintain air superiority and supremacy in combat areas will 
absorb the vast majority of monetary resources.  Because of this, there will be 
opportunity for contracting out low-intensity combat operations in situations where the 
USAF has air supremacy, as well as in missions such as close air support and surgical 
and single strikes. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES   
This thesis will be a structured, focused comparison of case studies of PMCs that 
have been used and contracted out by the U.S. federal government, namely the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).  This will include all of the military services that have used or 
currently use PMCs to support operations both at home in the United States and abroad.  
Additionally, the historical and international use of PMCs and the outcomes and issues 
identified by sovereign states employing PMCs forces will be analyzed.  Government 
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documents will be the primary sources for this research.  Secondary sources will include 
articles and books written by leading experts in the field.   
The historical aspect of contracting forces to support U.S. military missions will 
also be examined to demonstrate an increasing trend and need for the continued use and 
expansion of PMCs in current and future USAF operations. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I of this thesis will pose the major research question and importance of 
the work and will discuss problems, and methods and sources.  Chapter II will focus on 
the PMC and sovereign state functions of monopoly of war, legal recourses, and possible 
damage to political standing.  Chapter III will provide background on the usage of PMCs 
by the U.S. government and military.  Chapter IV will discuss the incentives and 
challenges of outsourcing military roles to PMCs.  Chapter V will present the conclusion, 
summary of findings, and any recommendations on how PMCs can be utilized in future 
USAF combat operations. 
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II. PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES AND SOVEREIGN 
STATE FUNCTIONS 
A. TODAY’S PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY 
The PMC of today faces unique and complex challenges in operating in the 
current business environment. PMC employees face certain limitations on the 
requirements and expectations in the performance of their contracts.  These expectations 
are even more stringent for a government contract, due to its oversight and accountability 
requirements.  Today’s PMCs are incorporated businesses run by executives and traded 
on the world stock markets, which offers them legitimacy and distinguishes them from 
mercenaries. It is important to note that the hiring of a PMC should not be equated to the 
employment of a mercenary.  To make this point more clear, mercenaries are defined as 
follows by the UN Mercenary Convention.2   
1. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
(b) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party 
to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of 
that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions 
in the armed forces of that party; 
(c) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(d) has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
2 A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:  
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence;  
                                                 
2 A/RES/44/34 72nd plenary meeting 4 December 1989 (UN Mercenary Convention). 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm (accessed August 13, 2011). 
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(b) is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment 
of material compensation; 
(c) is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such 
an act is directed; 
(d) has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory 
the act is undertaken. 
Nevertheless, PMCs are profit-driven entities that deal in complex currency 
contracts and stock sales to promote shareholder value. As is most often the case, PMCs 
are an incorporated entity; therefore, they would not meet the definition of a mercenary 
as per the United Nations definition.  However, this does not in any way mean they can 
be considered “lawful combatants” under the Third Geneva Convention.  It is this status 
that gives a nation’s armed forces the ability to conduct warfare and still maintain a good 
standing in the international community.  The Third Geneva Convention (“Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War”) ensures the humane treatment of enemy prisoners of war 
and holds the opposing state responsible for their capture and not troops or individuals of 
that state.  This is supported by the fact that national militaries are a direct extension of 
the political will of the government.   
Any forces not part of the national government cannot claim treatment as 
combatants under the Geneva Convention if captured.  PMC employees are not part of 
the national government; if captured, they are classified however the capturing state 
government wishes.  These prisoners, from spies to common criminals, are not afforded 
the same rights as enemy prisoners of war and are at the whim of the capturing state.  
How do we define the combat role of a PMC if its employees are not afforded the same 




As one executive notes, PMCs are “structured organizations with professional and 
corporate hierarchies .... We cover the full spectrum-training, logistics, support, 
operational support, post-conflict resolution.”3  Employees of today’s PMCs are highly 
trained and often have military or paramilitary backgrounds giving them specialized 
abilities desired by governments who lack the funding to provide the necessary skills and 
training.  These people often come from a state that has reduced its military and are not 
willing to reintegrate into civilian life.  Instead, they transition to fields that require 
specific talents and offer a desirable salary. 
Ordinary soldiers are not the only ones who have been left jobless.  It is believed 
that up to 70 percent of the former Soviet KGB agents have joined the defense, and PMC 
industry’s ranks.4  As Sinclair Dinnen notes, “The current revival in private military 
security is broadly consistent with the prevailing orthodoxy of economic rationalism, 
with its emphasis on ‘downsizing’ government and large-scale privatization.”5  Many 
state powers are contracting out and privatizing key military services. Great Britain has 
contracted out its aircraft support units, tank transport units, and aerial re-fueling fleet.   
Previously, all of these elements had been provided solely by the military and 
played vital roles in conflicts such as the 1999 Kosovo campaign.6  One source states that 
“Iceland is set to give a private army contractor the green light in what critics are calling 
the most ambitious move by a corporation to perform tasks once reserved for national 
militaries.”7 
                                                 
3 Timothy Spicer, founder of Sandline and now chief executive officer of SCI, quoted in Andrew 
Gilligan, “Inside Lt. Col. Spicer’s New Model Army,” Sunday Telegraph, November 22, 1998. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070519032042/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive
/1998/11/22/narmy22.html (accessed November 5, 2011). 
4 Peter Lock, “Military Downsizing and Growth in the Security Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 22, Issue 9, 1998, 1417. 
5 Sinclair Dinnen, “Trading in Security: Private Security Contractors in Papua New Guinea,” in 
Dinnen, Ron May, and Anthony J. Regan, eds., Challenging the State: The Sandline Affair in Papua New 
Guinea (Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, 1997), p. 11, quoted in Peter Singer, 
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International 
Security. International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter, 2001–2002, 198. 
6 Simon Sheppard, “Soldiers for Hire,” Contemporary Review, August 1999, http:// 
www.findarticles.com/m2242/1603_275/55683933/pl /article.jhtml (accessed November 5, 2011). 
7 “Cash-strapped Iceland to host “private army” – and Russian jet,” RT, August 31, 2010, 
srt.com/Politics/2010–08–31/iceland-army-russian-jets.html?fullstory (accessed August 13, 2011). 
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Moves by governments such as these lend support to the idea that private contracting of 
military missions is on the rise and could possibly be accepted by the rest of the world’s 
governments.  
B. STATE’S MONOPOLY ON WAR (INHERENTLY GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTIONS) 
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 defined many aspects of the ways people were 
governed and how the state used its powers.  Sovereign governments of each state were 
reorganized to have exclusive control over its lands, people, and agents abroad and the 
government took responsibility of warlike acts by its citizens or agents. 
Government functions and powers are never static and are in constant need of 
review.  Nowhere is this more evident than in inherently governmental functions.  The 
term “inherently” alone indicates that these roles are strictly reserved for, and used by, 
the federal government.  However, this is not always the case.  In fact, it is rarely the case 
when it comes to conducting combat operations.  The world is witnessing the gradual 
breakdown of the state’s monopoly over forms of violence.  By defining state’s rights 
when it comes to the use of force and inherently governmental functions, PMCs can be 
integrated into a government’s plan for policy implementation.  This would erase any 
issues of accountability or oversight that might arise in the use of PMCs to achieve 
governmental goals, while supporting the military. 
This raises the following questions: What are the roles of government when it 
comes to providing combat capabilities and are those roles strictly limited to the 
government?  Do the rights of governments in conducting warfare extend to employing 
contractors to execute the monopoly of force, or are they strictly “inherently 
governmental functions” as prescribed? 
1. Defining Inherently Governmental Functions 
The phrase “inherently governmental functions (IGF)” is a convoluted idea of 
perceived powers and rights that can only be used by a government. 
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These powers and sovereign functions have become blurred in recent years and all 
realized they needed to be redefined.  An attempt at defining IGFs was by the Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR). 
The FAIR defines “inherently governmental function” as one that is so intimately 
related to the public interest as to require performance by federal government 
employees.8  This was disregarded in an Office of Federal Procurement Policy memo that 
directed agencies to change the definition of IGFs under Office of Management and 
Budget OMB Circular A-76 in 2003.  This redefining of the outsourcing of government 
roles and responsibility created confusion and situations in which private contractors 
could be in a position to carry out IGFs.  This confusion ultimately led to a policy letter 
from the White House that called for the Director of the OMB to issue a policy letter that 
provided guidance to Executive Departments and agencies on circumstances when work 
must be reserved for performance by federal government employees.9   
The Obama Administration’s Final Policy Letter issued on Inherently 
Governmental and Critical Functions by the OMB on September 12, 2011.10  This policy 
letter states that combat is an inherently governmental function, but also that “federal 
employees perform and/or mange critical functions to the extent necessary for the agency 
to operate effectively and maintain control of its mission and operations.”11  The 
agencies are also to determine which activities can be carried out by contractors that are 
not critical to the agencies mission.  The door it seems has neither been opened, nor shut 
on contractors, but left to each agency to decide critical functions and activities that will 
be carried out by federal employees and which to contract out.   
                                                 
8 Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, October 1, 1998. Public Law 105–270 105th 
Congress. Sec 5: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_fairact/ (accessed August 13, 2011). 
9 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Government 
Contracting March 4, 2009, Office of the Press Secretary: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-
Agencies-Subject-Government/ (accessed August 13, 2011). 
10 Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Publication of the Office 
of FederalProcurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11–01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and 
Critical Functions, 76Fed. Reg. 56227 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
11 Ibid., 3, 63. 
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This very legislation, it seems may allow contractors to provide functions that might be 
viewed as reserved for the federal government, but not listed by the responsible agency as 
a critical or inherently governmental function.  Can contractors provide security in low, 
or no threat locations, possibly facing the use of arms in carrying out their contract?  
Today, it is critical to define the roles that PMCs will play in supporting the U.S. military 
or achieving objectives of the U.S. government, and how they will accomplish those 
roles. 
The Presidential Memorandum on Government Contracting, issued on March 4, 
2009, directs the OMB to clarify when governmental outsourcing of services is and is not 
appropriate, consistent with section 321 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) for FY 2009.   
Section 321 requires the OMB to  
(i) create a single definition for the term “inherently governmental function” 
that addresses any deficiencies in the existing definitions and reasonably 
applies to all agencies;  
(ii) establish criteria to be used by agencies to identify “critical” functions and 
positions that should only be performed by federal employees; and  
(iii) provide guidance to improve internal agency management of functions 
that are inherently governmental or critical.   
This directive prompted the OMB to issue a final policy letter12 that stated the definition 
of “inherently governmental functions” would be in accordance with the FAIR act.   
To answer how the FAIR definition affects and applies to providing combat 
capabilities of sovereign state governments, namely the ability of direct combat action 
involving conventional forces, we will focus on Sec. 5. (2) (B) ii, which states that: 
an inherently governmental function involves, among other things, the 
interpretation and execution of the laws of the United States so as to 
determine, protect, and advance United States economic, political, 
                                                 
12 Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Publication of the Office 
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11–01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and 
Critical Functions, 76Fed. Reg. 56227 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
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territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, 
civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise. 
By clarifying the definition and setting up tests to ascertain whether a function is 
inherently governmental, this policy is an attempt to balance the ability between 
contractors and federal employees of the United States government to protect the public 
interest, thus conducting combat operations.  The final policy letter also includes in its 
illustrative list of inherently governmental functions (1) all combat; (2) security 
operations in certain situations connected with combat or potential combat.13  When 
governments are no longer able to provide combat capabilities and private contractors are 
employed to achieve this function, then there could possibly be a merging of authority 
once considered inherently governmental.  These might then be perceived to be merely 
directed by governments but carried out by an organization or PMC.  If this happens, 
would a government be able to maintain its authority, or would these rights be transferred 
to a corporation? 
2. Monopoly on War  
War has been fought between neighbors, tribes, royalty, different cultures, and, in 
some cases, civilizations.  This thesis is concerned only with the current state of war, 
fighting between governments.   
Since the Vietnam War, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. 
government has outsourced larger portions of its military support operations to private 
contractors as seen in Table 1.   
 
                                                 
13 Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Publication of the Office 
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11–01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and 
Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227 (Sept. 12, 2011). 
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Table 1.   Presence of Contractor Personnel During U.S. Military Operations14 
Conflict Contractor 
(Thousands) 
Military    
(Thousands) 
Estimated Ratio of Contractor to 
Military Personnela 
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to6 
War of 1812 n.a 38 n.a. 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil War 200 1000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a. 
World War I 85 2000 1 to 24 
World War II 734 5400 1 to 7 
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5 
Gulf War 9b 500 1 to 55b 
Balkans 20  20  1 to 1 
Iraq Theater as of Early 2008c 190  200 1 to 1 
 
                                                 
14 Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from William W. Epley, “Civilian Support of 
Field Armies,” Army Logistician, vol. 22(November/December 1990), pp. 30–35; Steven J. Zamparelli, 
“Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For?” Air Force Journal of Logistics, vol. 23, 
no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 10–19; Department of Defense, Report on DoD Program for Planning, Managing, and 
Accounting for Contractor Services and Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations (October 
2007), p. 12. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
a. For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed by the 
U.S. government. However, because most civilians present during military operations are contractor 
personnel, the inclusion of government civilians should not significantly affect the calculated ratio of 
contractor personnel to military personnel. 
b. The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services during 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Personnel associated with those provisions are not included in 
the data or the ratio. 
c. For this study, the Congressional Budget Office considers the following countries to be part of the 
Iraq theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
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The planning and execution phases of military operations have become dependent 
upon such companies to provide the bulk of all logistics and support needed by the U.S. 
military, and has only increased during the current conflicts.
15
  The trend will only 
continue into the conflict realm, if the agency performing an activity no longer considers 
the activity a mission essential function to be carried out solely by government 
employees.  When an activity is not combat, defined as mission essential, or listed as a 
reserved inherently governmental function, then is it possible to contract out conflict 
operations?  It is possible to predict how the United States Air Force will conduct future 
combat operations by examining combat operations procedures of both the CIA and 
Department of Defense.  Before addressing these questions, it is first necessary to 
determine who has the right to wage war.  Is it a government’s right to decide and be 
responsible for engaging in combat, or can governments simply decide to go to war and 
employ private forces to achieve its combat goals?   
The current general assumption is that warfare is conducted by militaries that are 
extensions of a sovereign nation’s government.  This, however, is far from the truth, as 
warfare has been conducted by private personnel and entities for centuries.  As Jeffrey 
Herbst notes, “The private provision of violence was a routine aspect of international 
relations before the twentieth century.”16  Since World War II, governments have been 
more than willing to outsource or hire a PMC in order to strengthen, resume, or acquire 
the state monopoly.   
C. LEGAL BASIS FOR USE OF PMCS IN COMBAT ROLES 
With any contractual business model, fulfilling the contract is paramount to 
gauging the effectiveness of the principal-agent relationship.
17
   
                                                 
15 Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” August 2008. 
Table 2, 13. 
16 Jeffery Herbst, “The Regulation of Private Security Forces,” in Greg Mills and John Stremlau, eds., 
The Privatisation of Security in Africa (Pretoria: South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 1999),  117. 
17 Peter D, Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil Military Relations (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003). 
 14 
If a country or entity has the ability to control a PMC, then there is no need to worry 
about the sovereignty of that state.  If a states government is in control of its institutions 
and financial resources, then the chance of a PMC risking the ability of the government to 
function and act appropriately is relatively small and inconsequential. 
This also reinforces the idea that if a PMC is not fulfilling its requirements, it 
should be terminated without any adverse effect to the government. Laws, either national 
or international, could be the source for regulating PMCs’ actions and behavior.  When 
dealing with the relationship between the USAF and a contractor, the legal basis of both 
the USAF as an institution and the U.S. government as a whole gives latitude in hiring, 
firing, and oversight of the actions and performance of the contractor.  The 
investigational and legal powers of the U.S. government allow for the recoupment of 
funds, or concessions, in contract services provided.  As incorporated businesses, PMCs 
are subject to litigation in the U.S. judicial system, as well as internationally if they are 
based outside of the United States.  One of the most vivid examples of abuses by 
contractors was that of Abu Graib.  The final report concluded that the use of contractors 
as translators and interrogators was a key part of the problem.
18  Congress has since 
mandated that interrogation is an inherently governmental function that the DoD may not 
outsource.
19
  Is the DoD the only agency subject to this restriction?  Are other 
government organizations such as the DoS and the CIA exempt?  How does a 
government control contractors and ensure that their actions do not undermine national 
interest and policies?   
The Washington Post has reported on contractors that have been fighting their 
own battles with their own weapons, helicopters, and intelligence networks.20  When 
operations first began in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors were not held to the laws of 
                                                 
18 Peter W. Singer, “The Contract the Military Needs to Break” The Washington Post, September 12, 
2004. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2004/0912defenseindustry_singer.aspx (accessed August 10, 
2011). 
19 P.L. 110–417, sec 1057 (2009). 
20 Dana Priest, and Mary Pat Flahtery “Under Fire, Security Firms Form and Alliance” Washington 
Post, April 8, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&contentId=A59516–
2004Apr7&notFound=true (accessed August 28, 2010). 
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these countries, much less to those of the U.S. military, namely the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ).  Most of these contractors were hired using a Department of the 
Interior contract and not a DoD contract.21  The lack of accountability coupled with 
oversight issues and flaws in reporting incidents up the chain of command gives 
credibility to the claim that contractors operate differently than government employees.  
For reasons of military necessity, discussions about consequences and accountability are 
ambiguous, if not outright ignored. 
PMCs are not necessarily concerned with what is in the government’s best 
interest.  Their principal concern is their profit margin.  Once hired, a PMC has the same 
responsibility of judgments and actions placed upon it as originally assigned to a state.  
This is to ensure that any repercussions from actions by a PMC are absorbed by the 
contracting government.  A PMC’s decisions and actions are reflections of the hiring 
state.  When the numerous distractions to the difficulties in conducting security and 
combat operations are factored in, monitoring becomes much more complicated.  PMCs 
prefer to operate autonomously and will act however is best for their bottom line.  The 
rise of PMCs indicates that governments no longer have exclusivity in the use of force to 
execute foreign policy and military might, which may give PMCs more leverage in 
evading state policy restrictions.   
Civilian control over a military vies with the military’s need for autonomy to 
properly perform their duties.22  Once the military is given a mission or role, it then 
executes that function in a manner that is in line with what is desired by the civilian 
leaders in charge.  To properly perform its tasks, the military needs to be directed with 
clear and achievable goals by the elected leaders.  If the goals are opaque or misdirected 
then the military functions as best as to be expected and my assume roles not otherwise 
filled by other governmental agencies.   
                                                 
21 Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura, “Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (RL 32419), updated August 
25, 2008: 7–9. 
22 Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civilian Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and 
Limits,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 19, no. 1 (Fall 1992), 7–26. 
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The use of PMCs can upset and supplant the military’s core functions.  
Sometimes the need for political or military expediency trumps the views of a state’s 
legislation.  In the case of the United States, the congressional mandated end-strength of 
each of the military services has been augmented by hundreds of thousands of contractors 
in roles that had previously been performed solely by the military.  This creates undue 
pressure on the military to function with organizations or PMCs that may not have the 
same restrictions placed upon them as to the extent the military does.  Resulting friction 
in operations trying to achieve national goals between the civilian leaders who approved 
the use of PMCs that operate on a bottom line and with full autonomy, and the military 
that falls under civilian control and oversight, results in a evident struggle for autonomy 
and power under governments. 
Using PMCs relieves the political cost of having mobilized the National Guard or 
Reserve forces and place service members in the line of fire.  Does the Executive Branch 
gain too much power and autonomy from the Legislative Branch by doing this?  And, is 
there a risk of having a private-military operation that would be against the expressed 
wishes of Congress?  PMCs cloud the ability of a democratic government to operate 
freely.  The intent of a democracy is transparency and accountability, both of which can 
be significantly reduced when PMCs place controls over policy further from the electors.   
However, “most states find PMCs useful for implementing their own foreign and military 
policies and oppose efforts to restrict, let alone prohibit them.”23   
There is therefore a need to regulate PMCs so the transition from public forces to 
private ones is more easily accepted.  The 2007 NDAA24 placed contractors and others 
who accompany the U.S. military into contingencies under the UCMJ, which effectively 
put them under the same laws as military personnel.  It gives legal status to hold 
businesses that have expanded in a void to operate around, if not above, the law 
accountable for their actions while contracted by the DoD.  Officers in the field now have 
                                                 
23 David Isenberg, A Fistful of Contractors: The case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military 
Companies in Iraq.  Washington D.C. and London:  British and American Security Information Council. 
2004. 
24 H.R. 5122: John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 109th Congress: 
2005–2006. 
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means at their disposal to deal with contractor crimes and effective ways to handle 
disciplinary issues relating to contractors.  This gives the military greater accountability 
over the behavior of contractors instead of ignoring infractions or depending on civilian 
courts thousands of miles away and prosecutors with no authority to dispose of witnesses 
or claim legal jurisdiction.  
Historically, U.S. courts have not wanted civilians to be subject to military law.  
However, in order to integrate contractors into the order of battle, having all armed forces 
under one chain of command is the military necessity.  In times of war, military 
commanders have had broad powers over civilians or accompanying forces on the 
battlefield.  The inclusion of contingency operations has now expanded military 
jurisdiction over those civilians.  However, will it also include all agencies, civilians, and 
third country nationals?  It makes sense to have all those involved in a U.S. military 
mission fall under the UCMJ, even if they are contracted by another federal agency.   
The key here is that the DoD now has the ability to enforce the rule of law instead 
of merely reporting and releasing a contractor to his firm.  This authority may also 
provide for the treatment of civilians if captured while performing military functions.  
Legal protections and proceedings can be enacted against any contractor that commits a 
felony under the UCMJ.   
If the American government is willing to prosecute civilians under the UCMJ, 
then perhaps other countries will follow suit, which may lead to a U.N. charter regarding 
issues such as the treatment of POWs.  This would help clarify any actions taken by a 
contractor and provide legal recourse now missing in today’s combat operations. 
Leveling the rights and accountability between military and PMC personnel will open the 
door for governments to use contractors in place of troops to conduct missions that were 
once inherently governmental.  If this becomes commonplace, the link between PMCs 
and governments will become cemented and the role of government will become 
oversight versus executor as the bulk of operations falls to the PMCs.   
Governments must define their roles and account for their actions if they want to 
maintain integrity in the world’s eyes.  If necessary, they must adopt laws to ensure the 
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proper use of PMCs in operations involving combat and defense of national interest lest 
they remain vulnerable to the contract and those fulfilling it. 
D. POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES’ POLITICAL STANDING 
While the United States is capable of going it alone on any military operation to 
include winning a war, the recent administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush, 
William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, have relied on the international 
community for support and legitimacy in military functions other than war.  From the 
Gulf War to the current conflicts, the United States has enlisted the help of other 
governments in an attempt to legitimize its actions.  Building coalitions in military 
operations, or relying on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s support, legitimacy is 
at stake if the world’s view is going to be that the United States is engaging in combat 
operations utilizing a contractor and not holding it accountable for its actions.  It is my 
view that nations do not see the use of contractors as anything but an extension of the 
U.S. government or military.  Therefore, the United States should have control and 
accountability of those contractors when operating in foreign countries. 
While it has occurred that a contractor or sub-contractor has acted out of the limits 
of their contract and caused political difficulties for the United States, the likelihood of 
permanent damage to the standing of the government in the eyes of the world is small.  
As a transparent democracy, our political leaders are held accountable for their actions, 
and the United States does its best to abide by the treaties and agreements to which it is a 
signatory.  There are ways a government can take action in international courts against 
the United States for any wrong doings.  Institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization, International War Crimes Tribunal, and the United Nations allow for this to 
happen.  However, this has been difficult in the case of PMCs as the laws both 
internationally and domestically have been lacking.   
In the beginning of the Iraq invasion, PMCs were not accountable to any Iraq 
laws. “Under the Coalition Provincial Government order number 17, as revised June 27, 
 19 
2004, contractors are exempt from Iraqi laws for acts related to their contracts.”25  Only 
after events such as the one that occurred on September 16, 2007, in which Blackwater 
military contractors allegedly shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square, Bagdad, 
did the U.S. government try to reign in the control and accountability of its PMCs by 
placing them under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000.26   
While MEJA was a start, it provided little ability to prosecute a PMC for an 
infraction or crime.  The 2007 Defense Bill27 provided the first real ability to address the 
accountability of PMCs’ actions while in a security or combat role.  This bill places 
anyone who accompanies the U.S. military into contingency operations or war under the 
UCMJ; however, it only affects those contracted under the DoD.  While all agencies are 
not covered, it is a start making contractors in conflict situations accountable for their 
actions.  It is still not clear if this will cover any sub-contractors, third country, or local 
nationals. 
Another statute covering actions overseas is the War Crimes Act of 1996, as 
amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006. That act provides that “whoever, 
whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime . . . shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the 
victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.”28  The law applies to members of 
the U.S. armed forces as well as to any U.S. citizen, regardless of his or her employment. 
It would not apply to contractor personnel who are not U.S. citizens. 
E. INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
The international community has minimal authority to prosecute PMCs as those 
employed by the U.S. government are predominantly U.S. companies.  Further adding to 
                                                 
25 Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz, and Kennon H. Nakamura, “Private Security Contractors in 
Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues,” CRS Report for Congress (RL 32419), updated 
September 29, 2008: 14. 
26 P.L. 106–523, sec 1 (2000).    
27 H.R. 5122: John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 109th Congress: 
2005–2006 
28 18 U.S.C. § 2441. 
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this is the fact that the United States is a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council and can veto any measure it wishes, and refuse to be a signatory on 
particular conventions that might be applicable, such as the United Nations Mercenary 
Convention.29  As it is not held accountable to international laws, the U.S. government is 
at risk of alienating its partners and supporters when using contractors to fill vital military 
roles.  This raises several important questions.  Does the United States care what the 
international community thinks about its use of contractors in a combat role and the way 
it accounts for them, or is it trying to convince other governments to act similarly?  
Is it against any international laws, beliefs, or norms to use PMCs to perform 
tasks that have previously been considered inherently governmental?  Or, as long as the 
PMCs are held accountable for their actions, does it matter what roles they occupy?  
While this paper does not address these questions, they will have a profound impact on 
how the U.S. government uses PMCs in any future support and combat roles.  
                                                 
29 72nd plenary meeting on 4 December 1989, resolution 44/34, the International Convention against 
the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. 
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III. UNITED STATES’ USE OF PMCS AS COMBAT POWER 
The modernization of the U.S. military has left many holes that need to be filled 
by specialist and service providers.  Ongoing war-games and military exercises have 
revealed that the U.S. Army of the future will not be able to sustain itself or its operations 
without huge levels of technical and logistical support from private firms.30  Interestingly, 
James Adams states that: 
The U.S. army has concluded that in the future it will require contract 
personnel, even in the close fight area, to keep its most modern systems 
functioning. This applies especially to information-related systems.  
Information-warfare, in fact, may well become dominated by 
mercenaries.31  
KBR, a former subsidiary of Halliburton, originally focused on domestic 
construction projects, but has since found that military support and engineering are also 
profitable, having augmented U.S. forces in Africa, the Balkans, and now the Middle East 
with billions of dollars in contracts.  This includes supply operations (such as food, water, 
fuel, etc.), field operations (such as laundry, sanitary, waste management, morale 
activities, etc.), and other operations (such as engineering, construction and also support 
to communication networks).  Valerie Grasso notes that “The costs of these contracts 
would be a maximum of $5 billion per year and the lifetime maximum cost of the 
contracts would be $150 billion.”32  Some PMCs already provide battlefield capabilities 
to the U.S. government. In modern warfare, it is appropriate to examine how the U.S. 
government utilized combat power through the use of PMCs in World War II and 
afterwards. 
 
                                                 
30 James Adams, The Next World War, p. 113; and Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the 
Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For?” U.S. Air War College Research Report, March 1999, http:// 
www.au.af.mil/au/database/research/ayl999/awc/99–254.htm (accessed August 10, 2011). 
31 Thomas Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict,” Parameters 29, no. 2 
(summer 1999): 115. 
32 Valerie Grasso, “Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, September 20, 2010. 
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The U.S. military is also employing contractors and federal civilians to provide 
law enforcement and security at bases in America as well as the Middle East.  All of 
these employees are armed and must qualify for their positions the same as any member 
of the U.S. military branch they are replacing.  In the Central Command (CENTCOM) 
area of responsibility, contractors fulfill their contract and are not held to the same level 
of scrutiny as they would be in the continental U.S. where the protection of resources 
critical to the U.S. government and national security is considered paramount.   
The PMCs provide for the entry control and base security response for all 
breaches.  They are the first responders and initial on-scene controllers.  For example, the 
Special Operations Company (SOC) was contracted to provide base security at 
Contingency Operating Base Speicher, Iraq in 2008.  The SOC utilized Ugandan 
nationals to provide perimeter and tower security for the installation of approximately 
14,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel.   
In this instance, if attacked at an installation in the United States or abroad, the 
contractors would act as the first line of defense, delaying force, or, if necessary and as 
available, a counterattack option to retake an asset or area.  The old sayings that “a good 
offense is a good defense” and “defenses win championships” show that no matter what 
the contractors are employed for, they will undoubtedly face circumstances where they 
must act in the offensive.  Whether they are recapturing a resource the U.S. government 
deems critical to national interest and security or are in the employment of the U.S. 







A. USAF EMPLOYMENT 
It is clear that the government is outsourcing military and state roles involving 
support and logistics.  According to the Government Accounting Office report (GAO-11–
580), the U.S. government had $367 billion in contracts for operations in the DoD 
including Iraq and Afghanistan for FY2010.33  PMCs have already augmented the U.S. 
military in combat operations, training, and the entire spectrum of combat support.  It is 
current policy to have civilians and contractors perform jobs that traditionally had been 
filled by military personnel but have been deemed not appropriate for today’s military 
members due to the high demand of combat operations.  It is unclear, however, if the 
USAF will follow this trend when dealing with combat operations.  
It already has numerous contracts that provide support for infrastructure, as well 
as net-centric security, privatized housing, in-flight refueling, and maintenance and 
support for numerous airframes in its inventory.  Additionally, the USAF supports hiring 
contractors to fly and maintain the Global Hawk and predators unmanned aerial vehicle 
platforms, and provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of combat 
operations.  What will limit the scope of future operations such as close air support and 
combat sorties?  There has not been enough research and analysis conducted in this area 
to begin to answer the questions on combat and cost effectiveness, much less those 
addressing how to organize and provide command and control of the operators.  The term 
“inherently governmental functions” has the potential to address some of the command 
and control issues faced by the USAF.  An “inherently governmental function” is one 
that, as a matter of law and policy, must be performed by federal government employees 
and cannot be contracted out because it is “intimately related to the public interest.”  The 
command of military forces, especially the leadership of military personnel who are 
members of the combat, combat support, or combat service support role is not likely to be 
contracted out.   
                                                 
33 U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Contingency Contracting Observations on Actions 
Needed to Address Systemic Challenges,” GAO Report to Congress (GAO 11–580) (Washington, DC: 
GAO, April, 2011), Highlights section, 1. 
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However, as stated in a White House memorandum, “the line between inherently 
governmental activities that should not be outsourced and commercial activities that may 
be subject to private sector competition has been blurred and inadequately defined.”34     
In April 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced “that the military 
would shift more funding towards intelligence and personnel, rather than hardware only 
suitable for fighting major wars like the F-22,”35 specifically stating “that it is too 
expensive and does not have sufficient multi-mission capability for current military 
operations.”36  With the cost of both pilots and manned aircraft constantly escalating, it 
would be easy to see why the USAF might look at outsourcing some of its combat 
operations in conflicts where its best and priciest resources serve no purpose other than to 
spot a combatant with an AK-47 and drop a 500-lb smart bomb on him.  As the cost of 
training a new fighter and bomber pilot exceeds $1 million, it is not a steep climb to the 
next step of sourcing out this role. 
Why invest in an officer who will never climb into the cockpit of an operational 
fighter or bomber?  The advantages of using PMCs in the USAF are almost too numerous 
to list: savings in manpower, cost, maintenance, and infrastructure.  The disadvantages 
are also just as numerous: command and control, operations are no longer in the hands of 
U.S. military personnel, and treaty protections.  All of this raises a very important 
question.  Will these capabilities be there when you need them?  The USAF has some 
hard decisions to make about what its combat composition will look like in the future. 
                                                 
34 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Government Contracting: Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,” March 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.tdgovernmentsolutions.biz/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-
Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject_-Go.pdf. 
35 Kristina Sherry. “Senate votes to stop making more F-22 Raptor fighter jets” Los Angeles Times, 
July 22, 2009. 
36 Robert Gates. “Economic Club of Chicago speech by R. Gates on July 16, 2009,” defenselink.mil. 
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IV. ECONOMIC BASIS FOR OUTSOURCING MILITARY ROLES 
A. THE INCENTIVES OF STATES  
Many states, including the U.S. government, are looking for ways to limit their 
costs and risks while operating in conflict zones.  One way to relieve the budget 
constraints states continue to face is to reign in defense spending.  The reduction in 
spending while still maintaining capability is paramount to the U.S. military, and it is 
now seeking relief from the global marketplace to extend across the spectrum of military 
operations.  After years of war, there are several thoughts on the validity of the methods 
used that allegedly reduce defense spending, or, more realistically, limit the size of the 
military.  The goal of the U.S. military is to protect the U.S. national interest, not to be as 
cost efficient as a private company.  Any other line of thought is detrimental to the ability 
of the military to accomplish its missions.  
1. Monetary Savings of States 
After determining what the threats are to a government, how much money a 
government has is perhaps the single largest determining factor in the size and scope of a 
defense budget.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government has been 
looking for its peace dividend to materialize in the form of savings on the defense budget.  
By trying to realize and obtain this dividend, the ideal that privatization and free market 
forces of competitiveness would save money influences most aspects of defense spending 
and planning.  While this makes sense cursorily, it has never been realized because the 
inefficiencies of government operations can be passed on to the taxpayer, while in the 
private sector of outsourcing this is not allowed to happen.   
The conventional wisdom is that instead of maintaining a large standing military 
and thus incurring personnel cost and regular substantial budget outlays, any duties  not 
inherently governmental would be contracted, or outsourced to the private sector to reap 
the cost benefits.  A PMC would be hired as needed and then released after the 
fulfillment of the contract.   
 26 
Deborah Kidwell states, “Supporting regular forces with PMCs has the potential to be 
cost effective, to be politically expedient, and to enhance military effectiveness and 
national security.”37  Contractors cost the government far less than maintaining the same 
in-house ability because there are no reoccurring personnel expenses in recruiting, 
training, retention or health care.  By logically following this trend, it is easy to envision 
a growing dependence on contractors to perform any and all missions, thus relieving the 
U.S. military of some of its previous responsibilities.  It has become readily apparent that 
the U.S. military cannot operate without contractors.  From the level of Commercial Off-
the-Shelf (COTS) technology that requires specialized training and knowledge to operate 
and maintain, to the lack of ability of the U.S. military to transport or support itself once 
involved in hostilities, it has become clear that contractors are an ingrained part of the 
military in both political and operational form. 
All of this concludes with the Commission on Wartime Contracting identifying 
that up to $60 billion in contracts have been lost over the last 10 years in Iraq and 
Afghanistan due to lax oversight, fraud, poor execution, and corruption.38  This is in 
addition to the $206 billion that is estimated to be awarded for contracts in the theater of 
operations alone, not including normal contracting operations for the rest of U.S. military 
and government.  The FY 2010 NDAA approved $680 billion for the total defense bill 
with $124.8 billion toward military personnel and $130 billion for operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.39  With the amount of money spent on contractors, is there any savings to 
be found over the last 10 years from the wars in these two countries?   
While there may not be any overall savings, there are some areas where the 
private industry may be able to perform operations for the U.S military on a short-term 
basis that will reflect cost benefits.   
                                                 
37 Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military 
Companies,” Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005, p. 3. available at 
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/kidwell.pdf (accessed 6 October 2011). 
38 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Transforming Wartime Contracting 
Controlling costs, reducing risks,” final report to congress August 2011, 5. 
39 Public Law No: 111–84. October 28, 2009 
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In the case of close air support, a definite combat role of the U.S. military, it can be 
argued that the cost of maintaining, training, and operating in the CENTCOM area of 
operations has cost huge amounts of dollars.  This is due to the fact that the initial 
training cost of a pilot and the delivery method (jet aircraft) (roughly $2.6 million),40 and 
the price of munitions ($268.50 per Mk82 500lb bomb),41 far outweigh the cost of a 
bullet at 24 cents which is equally effective at performing the task of eliminating enemy 
troops or insurgents.  The question is, how can economies of scale be used here to save 
money?   
The elimination of the threat is the objective during combat operations.  
Accomplishing that with the least amount of cost is a secondary driver.  Eliminating the 
need for a fighter pilot to perform the mission as well as the cost of dropping a 500lb 
bomb on personnel armed with AK-47s in favor of allowing contracted pilots using less 
expensive airframes and munitions to perform the mission will result in a significant cost 
savings.  Of course, this would not be permissible in all instances, but it would be ideal 
for the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq where the threat to aircraft is minimal.   
A private pilot flying a prop driven aircraft such as the OV-10 used in Vietnam 
costs a few thousand dollars per hour.  This is significantly more cost-effective than a 
fighter or bomber providing the same capability at $40,000 + per hour.42  The question 
remains.  Would the U.S. government, and, in turn, the USAF give up the ability to 
directly control a close air support capability, or would they be willing to relinquish that 
control to a contractor when the nature of the conflict would allow for it?  Either way the 
savings may appear too lucrative to the bean counters and the decision may be made for 
the USAF.  Having the opportunity to contract out insurgent and security missions while 
maintaining the same ability in-house, albeit reduced, for a peer competitor, may be the 
only way to save this function for the USAF. 
                                                 
40  Michael Hoffman, “UAV pilot career field could save $1.5B,” Air Force Times, March 1, 2009, 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/03/airforce_uav_audit_030109/ (accessed 29 Sept 2010). 
41 Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/man/DoD-101/sys/dumb/mk82.htm  
(accessed 29 Sept 2011). 
42 “Combat Props Get Some Respect,” Strategy Page, September 17, 2009, 
http://www.strategypage.com/default.asp (accessed 29 Sept 2011). 
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2. Personnel Savings by States Using PMCs 
The idea of hiring personnel as needed to accomplish missions is often cited as a 
leading reason to outsource.  Using contractors, a government can instantaneously obtain 
the level of knowledge required to perform operations without the training, maintenance, 
and carrying cost of maintaining those same skills.  Developing the same experience and 
skill levels often takes weeks, if not months to years, and can cost millions of dollars 
depending on the requirement.  
The size and end strength of the military is mandated by Congress and, therefore, 
is tracked and audited by congressional oversight and laws.  PMCs, on the other hand, 
must only adhere to the cost of the service they are performing, and their hired number of 
personnel is of little concern to Congress. They can supply an enormous amount of 
manpower to accomplish missions for which the military may not have the personnel.  
The savings of personnel in uniform by contracting out is not readily evident in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as the ratio of contractors to uniformed military in 2009 was 1.1 to 1.43  
This has shifted slightly in the last two years due to surges in Iraq and Afghanistan that 
have changed the ratio to a more equal 1 to 1.  While many experts agree that contracting 
out does have the potential to save money on a short-term basis, the cost of hiring and 
maintaining a technical expert over the long term far exceeds the cost of a military 
member providing the same service.  The actual fighting is being performed by fewer 
individuals, but the support for those personnel is ever increasing, being filled by civilian 
technical experts not maintained by the military.   
The real cost of personnel cannot and should not be viewed as a one-to-one 
replacement of a military member with a contractor, since one military member can 
perform numerous different positions and abilities; instead, a contractor can and only fills 
one duty position.   
A military member can be a computer expert one day, provide security on 
another, and escort or food service the next.  A contractor would never perform duties not 
                                                 
43 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. “At What Cost? Contingency 
Contracting Iraq and Afghanistan Interim Report,” Washington, DC: June 2009: 21. 
 29 
in his contract.  As such, does it really make sense to hire multiple contractors to perform 
the same work that could be accomplished by one military member?  Is the argument that 
hiring contractors results in personnel savings truly valid? 
3. Equipment Savings of States 
An additional factor that influences the savings of personnel and money is the 
cost to develop and maintain material and equipment necessary  for combat operations.  
If those functions are contracted out, the dissolution of the requirements to maintain the 
equipment base has the potential to save the military a significant amount of money.  The 
way the U.S. military conducts combat operations has become very dependent on 
technology.  More often than not, that technology is only available from COTS suppliers 
and developers.  This makes the military more dependent on contractors to maintain and 
operate equipment that the military has not developed much less been trained to operate.  
This is a solid argument for contractors to own equipment that would then be leased by 
the military to accomplish combat operations.  Many contractors already have their own 
tools and gear that they use to service military equipment, which reduces the government 
cost of research and development, procurement, and maintaining supplies and 
accountability.  The cost to operate and maintain a jet fighter compared to a propeller 
driven airframe is immense, especially if the effects of a combat capability, such as close 
air support, in a conflict zone are the same. 
There have been numerous cost analyses done on the amount of money required 
to maintain a capability and all the knowledge and personnel necessary to keep that 
function available at all times.  The question is: is that combat capability relevant in the 
conflicts of today and tomorrow?  If the answer is no, than the government should 
contract that capability out if it wants to save money.  If it is relevant, then the 
government must continue to incur that cost for the sake of national security. 
B. THE CHALLENGES OF PMCS 
While it is evident that there are advantages to utilizing PMCs, it can be argued 
that there are disadvantages as well.  These range from management and control aspects 
to the oversight and accountability of PMCs and their actions.   
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The continued debate over the pay of contractors versus military personnel, and the 
subcontracting of work to un-vetted local or Third World Country nationals that seem to 
perform most of the work, continues to be a topic of discussion for policy makers, 
defense officials, and military commanders.  
1. Management of PMCs  
Any economic benefits derived from the hiring of PMCs are not an area of 
expertise for the modern military officer in general.  Thomas C Bruneau points out that 
“as the contractors are not under the direct control of the commander, but are necessary to 
the success of his plan or strategy, the absence of coordination or an interagency process 
is especially significant and even dangerous.”44  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
stipulates that contractors are part of the total force, but does not provide for a way to 
integrate them.   
DoD’s reliance on contractors presents several broader management 
challenges, including determining which functions and activities should be 
contracted out; developing a total workforce strategy to address the 
appropriate mix, roles, and responsibilities of contractor, civilian, and 
military personnel; and ensuring the appropriate oversight, including 
addressing risks, ethnic concerns, and surveillance needs.45 
As stated in the previous sections, there are numerous ways in which the federal 
government can save or waste money when it comes to PMCs.   
Fraud, waste, and abuse, the accountability and transparency of PMCs versus law, 
and existing accountability and oversight requirements are major factors that can lead to 
the success or failure of cost savings associated with contracting out military functions. 
Comptroller General David Walker states,  
DoD’s primary challenges have been to provide effective management and 
oversight, including failure to follow planning guidance, an inadequate 
number of contract oversight personnel, failure to systematically capture 
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and distribute lessons learned, and a lack of comprehensive training for 
military commanders and contract oversight personnel.46   
The often dysfunctional or loose arrangements between PMCs and the U.S. military have 
the potential to lead to operational failures, lack of command and control on the 
battlefield, and may interfere with the ability of the services to operate in a joint manner.  
Without unity of command there appear only to be dysfunctional chains of command 
between PMCs and the military.  Lack of effective management by a government can 
lead to any number of damaging outcomes, from troops not receiving needed support to 
the waste of monetary assets.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged this fact 
when he testified that contractor usage occurred: 
Without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were 
going to do it and without conscious decisions about what we will allow 
contractors to do and what we won’t allow contractors to do… We have 
not thought holistically or coherently about the use of contractors, 
particularly when it comes to combat environments of combat training.47  
The main issue is the apparent lack of planning that has gone into determining 
what exactly the DoD will need from contractors, how they will be managed, and what 
the strategic use of contractors will and should be in meeting U.S. military goals and 
objectives.  The experience of contracting personnel and coordinating the contracts 
between the services has been called into question with the premise that the DoD has not 
adequately planned for the use of contractors.48  If the U.S. government is going to 
continue to utilize contractors to provide support, especially in combat operations, clear 
operational guidelines for the use and objectives of the contractors must be defined and 
codified between the services. If this is not done, the reactive response that contractors 
are currently used for will continue to inhibit the ability of the U.S. government to  
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achieve its goals and national strategies and the current relationship between the military 
and contractors in CENTCOM providing combat training and security will be tumultuous 
at best. 
One of the largest concerns with contractors in general, specifically those that 
provide a combat capability, is the extent to which they will voluntarily accomplish the 
mission they are tasked to do.  It is common for contractors to walk off the job for any 
number of reasons, not the least of which is preservation of their own lives.  Convoys into 
Iraq ground to a halt when “KBR and other contractor truck drivers quit their job or 
refused to cross the border from Kuwait into Iraq when one of the KBR convoys was 
ambushed in April 2004.”49  One fear is what might happen to combat operations if the 
contractors were to stop providing support to the mission.  Peter Singer argues, “For U.S. 
military commanders, an added worry of terrorist targeting or the potential use of 
weapons of mass destruction is that their forces are more reliant than ever on the surge 
capacity of support firms.”50  But Zamparelli states, “legally contractors cannot be 
compelled to go into harms way, even when under contract, unless there is a formal 
declaration of war.” 51 The only consequences they may face are termination or 
reassignment to another base or contract.   
PMCs are not prosecuted when their personnel refuse to work or complete a 
mission.  In light of the fact that complete functions of supply, maintenance, and weapon 
systems have become totally dependent upon the contractor force, it is possible that the 
cogs of the machine will seize or break if even a small portion of PMC employees chose 
to leave.  While any entity can contract out a PMC, it is the institutions of a state 
government that have the most to lose by accepting the principal-agent relationship. The 
loss of direct control as a result of privatization carries risks even for strong states. How 
                                                 
49 Dina Rasor, “Contractors Say They Will Stay Despite Lack of Immunity: Want to Bet Our Soldiers’ 
Lives On It,” Huffington Post, December 12, 2007. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dina-rasor/contractors-
say-they-will_b_76474.html, (accessed, 2 December 2011). 
50 Peter. W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its 
Ramifications for International Security,” International Security 26, no. 3 (Winter, 2001), 186–220, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092094. 
51 Col Steven J. Zamparelli, “Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For?” Air 
Force Journal of Logistics 23, no. 3 (Fall 1999), 13. 
 33 
is a government to utilize a PMC to accomplish a combat capability, furthering national 
interest and goals, if there is no guarantee that the contractor will fulfill their agreement? 
A thought that has repeatedly resurfaced is the idea that PMCs will misrepresent 
themselves in order to acquire or continue a contract.  Peter Feaver states that: 
The very act of hiring creates perverse incentives for the agent to 
misrepresent itself, which thereby creates the chances that the principal 
will hire a lout: it is hard to verify the true type and a lout has a great 
incentive to appear even more attractive that a good worker.52   
This line of thinking suggests that PMCs’ main goals are obtaining and extending 
contracts in order to maximize profit.  Support was given by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee when it issued a report that found evidence that U.S.-funded prime 
contractors supported the Taliban by sub-contracting to warlords.53  The fact that the U.S. 
government is paying contractors who, in turn, pay our very enemies is not lost on the 
world opinion.  It is this very notion that enrages other governments and people who 
continue to foster a distrust of the U.S. government and its policies, specifically the way 
it goes about trying to achieve those policies in foreign nations. 
It can be argued that PMCs in fact conduct themselves in a professional manner 
when it comes to contract fulfillment lest they lose out on future contract extensions or 
expanded requirements.  This is important because the PMCs must act responsibility in 
accomplishing their mission or face termination.   
If they do not fulfill their obligations, the chances of them being hired by a 
responsible government or agency in the future is slim; however, the need for immediacy, 
talent, and experience often takes precedence over past reliability.   
In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the Ethiopians essentially contracted a fully 
equipped air force from the Russian aeronautics firm Sukhoi.  This air force consisted of 
Su-27 jet fighter planes, pilots, and ground staff.  Some observers contend that this 
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private military force from Russia failed to fully engage the opposing side and fully 
commit to the war.  It is rumored that they rarely engaged Eritrea’s air force, which itself 
was under suspicion of having hired Russian and Ukrainian pilots.54   
Another continuing concern for the use of contractors is the amount of pay they 
receive compared to a military member performing the same duty.  An active duty 
military member performing the same mission as a PMC employee may earn up to four 
times less.  The DoD has no strategy to deal with contractors that are paid above what 
government workers receive for the same services provided, while trying to justify the 
outsourcing claim in which saving money is the main proponent.  The few remaining 
factors that make traditional retention in the military achievable have recently become 
targets to reduce the overall budget deficit.  This has the potential to cause retention 
issues in the active duty force and recreate the hollow force of the 1990s not just in 
equipment, but in human capital and knowledge, two of last remaining strengths of the 
U.S. military.  Why would anyone want to commit to years of uncertainty, force 
reductions, stagnant promotions, lower morale, and substandard equipment when they 
could earn four times as much as a government employee, quit whenever they wanted, 
take a more lucrative position on the same contract, and only travel to a conflict if they so 
wished 
2. Current Command and Control  
Thomas C. Bruneau states that:  
There is no organization within DoD that collects information on 
contractors or the services that they provide.  This means that senior 
leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the 
extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations, and 
therefore have no basis for which to integrate them into any overall plan or 
strategy.55 
The GAO’s John Needham raised the same issues of control in a GAO report: 
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In addition to the risk of paying more than necessary for the work that it 
needs, is the risk of loss of government control over and accountability for 
mission-related policy and program decisions when contractors provide 
services that closely support inherently governmental functions, which 
require discretion in applying government authority of value judgments in 
making decisions for the government.  The closer contract services come 
to supporting inherently governmental functions, the greater the risk of 
their influencing the government’s control over and accountability for 
decisions that may be based, in part, on contractor work.56   
PMCs already make up a significant portion of the total defense and security force.  They 
are involved in operations alongside active and reserve forces and, most importantly, 
have assumed a number of the missions that previously were the exclusive responsibility 
of uniformed military personnel.57  Several Federal agencies including Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) define a PMC in terms of the following four 
functions: 
1. Static Security: protect fixed or static sites such as housing areas, 
reconstruction work sites, and governmental buildings 
2. Convoy Security: protect convoys traveling in Iraq  
3 Security escorts: protect individuals traveling in unsecured areas in Iraq 
and, 
4. Personal security details: provide protective security to high-ranking 
individuals.58   
Thomas Bruneau states:  
It must be noted that these four functions, which are within the roles and 
missions related to fighting wars, internal wars, and peace operations, 
require that the contractors be armed.  This means that they can either 
respond to hostilities, or, if they perceive an imminent threat, they can 
preempt it by initiating the use of force.59 
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The State Department had a need for the protection of DoS personnel in 
Afghanistan and asked the DoD for support.  The DoD refused, citing a lack of sufficient 
resources.  “The military provides security to contractors and government civilians only 
if they deploy with the combat force or directly support the military’s mission.”   
As a result, the use of contractors to provide security has increased-a well-
publicized and controversial aspect of the contractor support in Iraq.”60  
The DoS, as well as any other governmental agency including Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), had no other option but to contract PMCs to provide protection of 
their personnel and operations since the DoD was unable to perform the requirement.  
Additionally, the current state of affairs between the military and contractors in 
CENTCOM providing combat training and security is turbulent at best.  
C. HISTORICAL STATE RELIABILITY (MILITARY DESERTION)  
While arguing that PMCs’ record for completing contracts is suspect, the same 
cannot be said of the U.S. military and its desertion rates.  “With the fiscal year ending 
Sept. 30, 1,061 soldiers had been dropped from the Army’s rolls because of desertion.  
That was a decline of more than a third from the total for 2010.”61   
As with any conflict, the desertion rate of the military will change as situations at 
home and in conflict zones worsens or improves based on popular support, opinion, 
political rhetoric, and lethality. 
In comparison to the desertion rates of 5 percent during the Vietnam-era 
conscripted army, the rates during the current conflicts have remained low with an 
average of 10 deserters per 1000.  There is currently no way to compare this to the right 
to refuse to work afforded a PMC employee, but the current state of the economy as well 
as the fact that the military is made up of an all-volunteer force most likely plays a role in 
the low rate of desertion when compared to Vietnam.  However, this does not directly 
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translate over into prosecution of deserters as, “from 2002 through 2006, the average 
annual rate of Army prosecutions of desertion tripled compared with the five-year period 
from 1997 to 2001, to roughly 6 percent of deserters, from 2 percent, Army data 
shows.”62 As such, there is no data with which to compare to military desertion rates 
during the current conflicts.   
Here, I can only surmise that the personnel who volunteer to perform the contracts 
know what is required of them and, as most of the assignments are of such short duration 
compared to a military enlistment, there are relatively low refusal rates.  After all, the 
personnel who volunteer for these posts are usually unafraid to protect themselves and 
their clients as the pay is so good. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
While the idea of competition and outsourcing to reduce costs works in numerous 
business models, the same principles do not apply to a government’s needs during a 
military operation.  While it is true that hiring contractors to perform certain missions or 
operations at specific times can save money; those savings may disappear when the 
contracts extend over a long period of time.   
Thus far, the only recognized way to save money using PMCs in military 
operations is to use them to initially augment military forces.  The PMC contract should 
be discontinued once the military has had sufficient time to expand and train the number 
of personnel needed for an operation.  Upon the completion of the operation, the military 
can then return to its pre-conflict size and scope of responsibilities.  Paying a contractor 
over four times as much as a federal employee to perform the same function over the 
length of time of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts does not appear to have any cost 
savings benefits, either in personnel or monetarily.  However, it has cost political capitol 
support in the Middle East.   
It must be understood that certain functions performed by military personnel 
occurring over extended time periods will be less cost-effective overall than a PMC 
performing the same functions.  Once air supremacy and superiority have been 
established over a territory, and there is no more direct air combat or threat from anti-air 
defenses, it does not make sense to continue using next generation fighters to provide 
close air support or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.  The cost of training 
and maintaining a military member to pilot a jet fighter is enormous compared to a 
private pilot and company providing its own airframe and munitions.  These functions 
could be contracted out to save training, maintenance, and carrying cost associated with 




The current methods of accounting for and providing oversight of PMCs do little 
when compared to the rigorous methods and requirements placed upon the military for 
the same purposes of accountability.  The lack of integration of PMCs into the operations 
of the military, forecasting for their use, and any budgeted funds that have been proven 
saved in the current model of contracting to support military operations in CENTCOM 
have gone largely unrealized, or, have for the most part been ignored. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The U.S. government must review its political motives when committing 
the military to combat operations.  Either the correct amount of military force must be 
used initially to accomplish the mission or a repeat of the current conflicts will occur.  
The U.S. government must review, if not make a legal framework for, the command and 
control, accountability, and oversight of the use of PMCs in direct combat and support 
operations.  This must apply to not only the DoD but to all agencies.  The determination 
must be made for the use of PMCs in combat versus security and protection operations, 
and if and when to use them during what might be considered inherently governmental 
functions.  Laws and bi-lateral agreements, etc., must be made to meet the transparency 
and accountability requirements of a democracy and be able to withstand international 
scrutiny and rebuke from foreign governments and NGOs. 
2. The U.S. military must decide how, to what extent, and when it will utilize 
PMCs to execute its missions.  The evolution of this employment must be made 
throughout the DoD, and not independently by each service for its own needs.  The 
military must further define the mission of each service and the core capabilities that they 
must retain in response to current and future threats. 
3. The USAF must determine what combat roles it must maintain in-house 
and which can be outsourced while still meeting its core capabilities for fostering U.S. 
policies and security.  It must either establish lower cost in-house combat operation 
capabilities in the Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard Forces that would eliminate 
the need for PMCs or accept them as a part of the current and future force structure and 
contingency response framework.   
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These capabilities must be examined on a onetime, as well as a reoccurring basis, 
of short to long time periods, with a cost benefits rationale attached.  The use of PMCs in 
such roles must be weighed against the need to accomplish political and military goals. 
4. The U.S. military must not always be placed on the same level as private 
businesses with regards to cost effectiveness by the public or elected officials.  It cannot 
assume cost cutting and free market measures to reduce cost and operating expenses in 
the short-term as this will risk significantly reduce capabilities in the long-term. 
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